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SOME BASIC DATA FOR ANALYSING THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN K E N Y A 
This paper presents the first results of a data gathering project 
on foreign investment in Kenya, The project when completed will provide a 
data bank of information on approximately 75 foreign investments made in 
Kenya from 1960 to 1970, Information will be included on the foreign 
parents as well as on the local subsidiaries, but the results reported now 
will de^l only with the Kenya subsidiaries. The remaining information on 
I 
the parent companies will be assembled in the United States using English 
and "American sources."'" ) -,; 
The data to be summarized in this paper deal with the sources of 
foreign investment.in Kenya, their propensity to take local partners, both 
private and public, their use of local savings as via bark loans, and their 
size. The information is presented primarily in the form of averages and 
percentage distributions; i.e. no sophisticated statistical analyses are 
2 attempted, ) 
Nevertheless, rather than wait until the project is completed 
to share any of my results, it seemed appropriate at this point to make 
available what I have on 81 foreign investments made in Kenya over the past 
eleven years. My reason is primarily to try to generate comments within 
I.O.S, and without or what the data mean. There is a great deal of general 
discussion in the economics profession, in the press, and so on on what the 
role., of foreign investors in Kenya should be. By presenting some empirical 
findings, it is hoped this paper will contribute to the discussion. 
1, ' I.D.S. will receive a copy of the complete 'data set, 
2, Nor have any significance tests been run, for example on the 
differences between means in various cells of the tables to be presented 
below. There are a number of reasons for this. First, my aim has been 
to examine the total population of new foreign investments made in Kenya 
in the 1960*s, not.a sample of them.. To the extent I have caught them 
all in my data search procedures, the:averages reported are hot sample 
statistics.but population statistics (l believe I have caught most fcvt 
perhaps not all). On the other hand, to the extent, that foreign investment 
in Kenya is like foreign investment ?n the rest of the developing world, 
the data investigated here might be (icosely) viewed as a sample of tuese 
foreign investments, andj, thus significance tests on these results cculd 
be appropriate. However, given serious personal time constraints, this 
did not seem an important enough exercise at this point; i.e. before the data 
on parent firms is even assembled. 
~ 2 - i i 
The remainder of the paper describee how the data were 
collected, how variables were defined and then presents the summary tablee^ . 
It is hoped that whoever looks at i/he tables also examines the procedures 
used in deriving the data they contain since the results are no stronger , 
than the methodology used to derive them. .. . 
I, How the data were, gathered 
y... ... The first interesting fact about the data is that it has all 
been compiled from public information primarily fr<W the documents and 
annual returns filed with the Registrar General as pkrt of Kenya's 
Companies Act.^ There is ^ hus no problem with reluctance of companies to 
reveal information which might get into public view J a standard problem with 
direot surveys of companie4. On the other hand, not all the information 
.one might want to obtain is publicly filed; so, part of what one-,gains in 
ease of access he loses in incompleteness of data. Nevertheless, the, infor-
mation one oan collect is a significant advance ovet what has been known -; 
about investor behavior. . . : 
A second interesting .fact about the data is that it inoludes 
very.,sna^ ll-ag^ nc 11- as- yery-iarge invest»iunls7''and"ijnveatmenta a^ wide 
variety of sources ranging from Europe t.o India an4 Hong Kong. 
} % object was'to find every new foreign investment' in manufac-
turing in Kenya from 1960 to 1970. . This was done by a multi-staged search 
procedure. FirstT I used an Index to Mahufacturors and Produots published 
by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in June, I967 to get a list of 
firms and their products as of 1966. The list contains 558 firms and is 
tfce most complete list of thijB jBort puUfehed.^ j 
1*1.11 ji _ ji 1 • ' ir' 11 1 ' ' "' 
. r - . . . , . . . . { 
3) I should here like to. note my gratitude to Mr. O.M, Same3a and his staff 
f at the Companies Registry for their considerable assistance and patience 
I with my.always being underfoot. • / 
4) However, the list is neither wholly complete no* wholly accurate1 as *> 
pointed out to me hy Mr. A.N. Gakunga of the Ministry of Commerce and 
i Industry. The major flaw however is in including as manufacturers firms 
i which are really trading establishments, e.g. firms whioh paste labels 
/ on jars and oall it manufacturing to avoid being classified as trading 
-establishment!.. Mr. Gakunga also-believed they missed a number of sm^ll 
mai^acttiring Tirms, in their list, but ..believed that-their coverage of 
bigger firms was good. Nevertheless, as can be seem from my tables bol,ow 
a substantial number of smaller firms were indeed picked up by this list* ••^.v- - - . ,;..•,. . ,< • ' " " / . 
For each firm on the list I found, at the Companies Registry, 
those •which were limited liability companies and thus filing information 
under the.Companies Act. Thus, armed with a list of manufacturing 
companies, I was able to search through the files at the Companies Registry 
to select out those with foreign ownership and finally, of those firms, which 
5) made "new investments" between I96O and 1970. 
Hew investments were defined to include any of the following: 
(i) new firms being established in Kenya by new foreign 
investors f 
(ii) existing firms with foreign ownership increasing their 
equity capital and/or debt by such a magnitude (and : 
thereby increasing their assets by like amount) as to 
substantially change the firm (Thus, for example, Pfizer 
Corporation has been in Kenya as a private Kenya 
registered company since 1957» but it expanded.its issued 
and paid up equity by ten times in 1966 to £50,000. 
Previously, it had rented premises and mainly acted as 
a sales outlet. Since 1966 it has owned its own plant 
for mixing and packaging its products. It seemed such 
an investment should be included in this study. 
So also, it seemed, should substantial expansions 
be included. However, only those financed by new equity 
issues paid for in cash, in new machinery, etc.^and/or 
5) Another minor point is that only companies which had not been struck 
off the Registry were included; i.e. only existing firms plus those in 
receivership ana in the process of being wound up are included. This 
point is minor because judging from the names of the firms I could not 
locate, i.e* those firms struck off the Registry, I would guess very 
few, if any, were foreign manufacturing investments. Rather they seem 
to have been primarily small firms waned by East African .'Asians« The 
files for these companies can be obtained with some effort from the 
basement of the Registry, but given time constraints it did not seem 
worth it, 
6) I.E., increases in equity from the issues of bonus shares to capitalize 
past profits are net considered as investments. We are interested here 
onlgE in changes-- in financial structure of firms related to the creation, 
of new assets. 
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"by new debt have been included since only those show 
up in the reports and documents in the files of the 
Companies Registry. In other words, this study will 
have nothing to say about investments financed out of 
retained earnings or unsecured loans.from parent com-
panies on capital or current account, as there is no 
public information on these for private companies in 
Kenya); 
(iii) existing local bompanies taking on new foreign 
partners who bring with them significant new capital 
as opposed to merely transferring ownership of 
existing assets. (Thus, for example, I have included 
the takeover by Del Monte in 1968 of the previously 
largely locally owned Kenya Canners Ltd, since Del 
Monte not only bought out most of the previous share-
holders but also took a new allotment of shares in 
196.9 for £238,135 cash, which.itself more than doubled 
the value of paid in capital, Further, they also 
extended loans to the gcopany). 
Another point of definition is how "foreign" a. firm had to be to 
be included in the analysis, A candidate firm was taken to be foreign if: 
(i) it had any direct non-East African ownership, either 
by individuals or companies; 
(ii) it had any shareholders which were themselves Kenya 
registered companies but which were in turn majority 
owned .by Kenya registered companies which were themselves 
majority owned by non-East" African interests, eto, 
(iii) it had any shareholders which were themselves Kenya 
registered companies which weye in turn majority owned 
by non-East African interests, etc. 
It will be seen that I have thus excluded from the collection 
of foreign investments all those made by companies or individuals from 
Tanzania or Uganda, The major effect of this is to exclude the Madhvani 
,be 
and Mehta indusirrial. empires^ These seem to me to/really indigenous capi— 
talist organisations and of a different nature than firms coming into a 
foreign country to invest. \ 
Also most foreign companies which do some to East Africa with 
the intention of setting up subsidiaries in more than one country seem to 
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come to Kenya first. Or, at least, I have not come across any Kenya manu-
facturing companies which were subsidiaries of Uganda or Tanzania registered 
companies which appeared to he themselves foreign investments. On the.other 
hand, certainly Tanzania's brewing and cement industries, as two cases, were 
subsidiaries of Kenya companies which were themselves largely foreign 
controlled. For the most part, the investments in Kenya from Tanzania and 
Uganda are those made by the Asian communities, and are thus indigenous. 
Thus, a list of foreign manufacturing investments through 1966 
was systematically compiled. For investments made since then the search 
was necessarily more ad hoc and I fear,though have no way of knowingfthat my 
coverage of the new investments has been less complete for the smaller sized 
firms, at least. The search procedure was as follows. 
First, a new Index to Manufacturers and Products is being pre-
pared jointly by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning. The Index is scheduled to appear some 
time in August.I was told and Mr. S.S. Eeyer, Chief Statistician at the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning was good enough to lend me a pre-
liminary version of the Index. Unfortunately, this version was considerably 
preliminary, and incomplete especially for the latest years. Then again, 
I am interested not only in firmsaorrerrily in production, but also firms 
for which investments have started but have not yet been completed. 
Nevertheless, I repeated the search at the Companies Registry using this 
new preliminary list. 
For the most recent investments, my procedure was to skim through 
business periodicals and the Annual Economic Surveys published by the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The latter discuss significant 
developments in each industry in Kenya, but only rarely mention individual 
companies by name. However, at least they mention where there is investment 
activity. The business periodicals usually do give company names and 
activities .but there is no reason tc expect them to be complete.^ On the 
other hand, these magazines do not only discuss the big investments; e.g. 
mention was made of Brooke Bend's diversification into the fly tieing 
business which presumably means if the bottom falls out of the world tea 
7; My priiftary "sources' we're East African Report on_ Trade" and. Industry, 
Kenya ^xport News (issued lath the first), Ear.t ^ firjean. Trade_ and Industry 
(predecessor to the first), Barcloyn Overseas .Review, £.11 monthlies, and 
the daily papers since arriving in" Kenya in February* I also perused the 
the. National Christian Council of Kenya's jfao Controls Insagtiy in Kenya? 
(Nairobi: East Afriean Publishing House, 1968) to check my data for 
1968 and previous years. 
market, they can make it selling fishing flies. Nevertheless, I was not 
happy about this search procedure, The major cost, however, is that it 
restricts our ability to draw confident time series conclusions from the 
assembled data, but does not seriously affect our ability to,analyse the 
data,by.siae of investment or by country of origin. That is, I am 
concerned about coverage for 1969 and 1970 only and I would doubt that any 
missing investments could overwhelm the results below by size or source of 
investment.^ 
II. How the variables were defined 
Given the collection of foreign investment, it was first 
necessary to define when the investment, took place. The usual sequence for 
the legal "birth" of a firm in Kenya begins when the company is formed 
(registered) usually with two individuals (often Nairobi advocates) as the 
owners, each with one share. In many cases the original shareholders will 
be directors of the company but not always. Sometimeslater, the length of 
time varies from days to many years, directors are appointed and the serious 
issuance of shares begins with share "allotments" sometimes spread-over 
-"years until a plateau is reached. Thus, for new firms, although the company 
comes into existence when it is registered and in this sense represents a 
"decision" to.invest the actual investment seems to take place when money 
changes hands, i.e. when the Kenya firm obtains the funds via share allot-
ments and loa.ns, with which to build a factory and commerce operations. 
Perhaps, the date of company registration can be taken as the 
date of firmest intention to invest. The date of the first allotment will 
8) Perhaps, the best outcome from this paper could be to interest the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in redoing this phase of the 
study using their complete and confidential information on what companies 
operate in Kenya. For my own purposes, the need to extend my analysis to 
include information about parent firms might preclude my ability to 
maintain confidences about the. identity of individual subsidiaries 
operating in Kenya. This is ironic since the final results being 
statistical in nature, probably will not reveal anything about specific 
individual firms. 
Perhaps the second best outcome of this paper could be to interest 
someone inside IDS or out, to use the new Index of Manufacturers and 
Products when it is issued to see if there are missing companies and to 
then add them to the study. Regretably, I will have left Kenya by the 
time the new Index appears and so cannot do it myself unless I am able 
to return. 
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"be taken as the date of investment itself. Similarly for expansion or 
diversification investments, the investment is dated from the appropriate 
issue of shares or debt. That this should be a reasonable definition of d 
date of investment may be illustrated by an example. Associated Battery 
Manufacturers (East Africa) Ltd, was registered in June 1963. The board 
of directors was not officially aapointea until April 1965 and the shares 
were first alloted the following month. It would appear from these dates 
that these British investors decided to wpit with their investment until 
after Independence to see, perhaps, whether it would be too risky to invest 
in an independent Kenya. To take 1963 as the investment date would thus be 
misleading. 
Closely associated with the problem of dating an investment is 
the problem of defining its siae. Here, however, the problem is mainly 
practical as theoretically one should clearly take some measure of new 
assets as the size measure. The problem is that private companies do not 
have to file any informati on on assets, only on finance. Thus, we must 
approach a size of investment measure from a financial angle. Again, there 
is a problem of insufficient information filed for a complete and accurate 
measure, 
The sources of finance for a new firm are equity, long- term debt, 
short-term debt (overdrafts at banks, suppliers' credits) and advances or 
loans from the parent company. Now, all private companies must file at the. 
Companies Registry their equity (and whether paid for in cash, in machinery, 
plant and equipment, in management services, etc.) and the current amount 
of their registered debt (i,e. debentures and charges on fcheir assets and 
mortgages proper). Most long term debt and most sizable overdrafts are 
registered as the bank, insurance company, finance comparer, etc,.wants the 
guarantee registration entails. However, except in the odd case, loans and 
advances from parents to subsidiaries are not registered, which is undertand-
able, it all being in the same corporate ''family". Neither are suppliers' 
credits registered* possibly because they are relatively short run. 
In any event, one cannot get a confident, complete picture of 
the finance marshalled for any new investment from the public files. Even 
more, for expansion and diversification investments, which can be financed 
q) 
out of retained earnings, the data in the files are incomplete."' Thus, here 
one must, compromise his principles before the difficulties of empirical 
9) This is under*andable as the filed were not constructed for economists 
but, it seems, for company creditors. 
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research and accepts an inadequate definition of size, The size measure 
used is the sum of equity and debt to the extent it is known (and always 
excluding suppliers credits), measured at the nearest available date after 
the series of equity issues and "borrowings which fiaaaice.the investment. 
Obviously, for expansion and diversification investments, it is the change 
in equity and debt that is us&d. 
We thus know right away our measure underestimates the size of 
investments and until more information is gathered on the complete financial 
behavior of companies we will not know if/is any systematic relation between 
hidden internal and publicly knowable finance of foreign investments. 
However, I do believe the size measure adapted is sufficient for my purpose 
which is to roughly separate the investments by size categories; i.e., it 
is essentially to separate out small from big investments. Eew,unless .. 
internal finance is a primary form of finance.for small companies and a very 
secondary form of finance for large companies, or there is some.similar 
systematic relationship between internal and external financing, then it. 
does not seem my size classification should be systematically off. Thus, 
one might play Milton Friedman for a moment and say that since we know of 
no systematic reason why firms with a smaller sum of equity plus known 
debt should have a larger amount of internal financing, we may assume that 
no relation exists or a proportional relation exists, both of which 
assumptions allow us to maintain the size glassification at hand. Of course, 
this is not satisfactory, but help is near, in fact at IDS, Nick Snowden 
is now working on a study of company savings behavior using data extracted 
from companies with the aid of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
If he is able to find a relation between uses of internal and external 
finance, and if this can be related to the financing of large investments, 
we may be able to derive a better financial measure of investment size. 
With respoct to all other variables to be used in this study, 
they are straight forward and defined as they are introduced in the following 
section. If the above discussion has been bleak and emphasized problems 
with the data it has been wholly intentional. Foreign investment is such 
an emotionally charged topic that it must be clear how much is and is not 
being said by the tables that follow„ 
III, What the data show 
The results.will be presented here in the form of a series of 
summary tables. First, is a summary by the country from which the foreign 
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40 percent of their investments were ,;small". The last category, Hong Kong 
and Australia wholly favour these "small" investments. It can also be 
observed that this size breakdown exactly paasSSLels the order in which foreign 
companies began investing in Kenya. 
One can offer possible explanations for these patterns. First, 
it is not merely a statistical quirk; i.e. British investments were not 
smaller in early years and bigger in later years which would have made it 
the case that British investments were on the average smaller because they 
started earlier. In fact, all five of Britain's investments in 1969-1970 
were in this "small" category. 
Rather, I would speculate that investment in Kenya is a culturally 
more foreign proposition for the business communities of the U.S.A. and jaa 
Japan and, so, small firms are less likely to come, hence fewer small 
investments from these countries compared to the U«,K», Continental Europe 
and the Aga Khan. The U.K. and Europe are traditional colonial powers in 
Africa and the Aga Khan has his Ismaili Community here. 
One might wonder why this does not apply to India, given the 
sizable Asian Community in East Africa. But then, one also wonders why 
in the world India is exporting capital in the first place. • One'&possibility 
here is that perhaps Indian firms are dumping their used equipment here 
which they capitalize as share capital. This suspicion might "be aroused 
by the last two o&bumns of table I. If this were the case India would not 
be exporting ^ -pfcfcal ce muali as expertise compared, to o^her isTestcsrs. 
However, another hypothesis, before having more information on 
the Indian,companies themselves, is that the parent firms are large, view 
themselves, as &&w~"i±te-?iBZrtional--corporations", and try.to follow the 
behaviors of that species of enterprise. In other words, investments from 
the U.S.A., Japan, and, perhaps, India may largely represent investments 
by the relatively new form of large, aggressive "international firms" that 
plan in terms of global markets. This would be compared to the predominance 
of older type, f empire-associated foreign investments- ftoui the U.K. and 
Europe^very often being associated with settlers in the colonies, 
. With respect to the small.investments from Hong Kong and 
Australia, I would guess that, first, because these are largely private 
capital importing areas with high internal cppital demands, the supply of 
capital for export is small and thus their investments abroad are small. 
Second, I would guess the Australians behave as the U.K. while the Chinese 
are following the Indian model on a smaller scale, at least.partly with 
respect to gaining equity through equipment sales. However, again more 
information on the parent companies is needed. 
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A very different grouping of investing countries appears when we 
look at the use of local partners in these investments in table II. Here 
we see the Aga Khan having the most local participation which was expected 
since indeed part of his reason for investing is to help local capital. 
We also see the Japanese and Indians getting about 40 percent of their 
equity capital locally but with the Indians tending to get relatively more 
Table II. Use of local equity capital by foreign investors 
Investor 
average share of local 
equity in investment (%) 
average private 
holding's (%) 
average public 
holdings (%) 
A^a Khan 56.7 40.0 16.7 
Japan 42.8 32.0 10.8 
India 39.7 20.5 19.2 
Continental 
Europe 21.1 16.7 4 .4 
Australia 20.3 5.8 . 
U.K. 17.6 12.2 3.3 
U.S.A. 13.2 . 5.0 8.2 
Hong Kon^ r 8.8 8.8 _ 
Of it from public sources, mainly the Development Finance CSmpany of Kenya 
(DFCK) with some also from the Industrial and Commercial.Development 
Corporation (ICDC). I third-grouping seems to be Europe, Australia and 
the U.K. (Australia's big public partner was the Agricultural Develop-
ment Corporation). Finally, the U.S.A. and Hong Kong seem to relatively ' 
shun local partnerships. With American firms at least, this seems to 
arise from the desire to maintain fairly complete control over their 
investments ana, as one firm has expressed it to me (not in Kenya), they 
j 
feel they do not need local partners to be able to deal with local govern-
ments, On the question of taking one's local partners from the private 
or public sectors, it appears that the U.K. and Europe seem to prefer 
private partners relative to the preferences of Japan and India. This 
may have something to do with Europe and the U.K.'s longer association 12) 
through settlers here, especially the Europeans. ' One hypothesis, 
additional to historical precedent as just suggested, is that in India 
and Japan the relation between business community and Government is closer 
12) In fact, oat of the four cases in which European firms took local 
partners, from 1960—1970 in only one were the partners non-Europeans. 
This was the Italian investment in Kenwool which has a majority Kenya 
African and Asian participation. Similarly, in this period, British 
firms formed partnerships in eleven oases, in nine of which the 
partners were British Kenyans and in only two of which the partners 
were from the Asian Community. 
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than in the West where idealogy stresses Government controlling "business 
in the public interest rather.than Government assisting business in 
developing the economy. Thus, firms from India and Japan might be more 
ready to form partnerships with public bodies in Kenya than would 
European or British investors. 
On the other hand, one oould suggest a purely statistical 
explanation to Britain and Europe's relative avoidance of local.public 
partners; i.e. that they were investing before there was a DFCK, ICDC, etc. 
with which to go into partnership. However, 24 of Britains 34 investments 
were made in 1965 or after as were ten of Continental Europe's twelve. 
Another statistical explanation might arise from the fact that, 
as illustrated in table I, Britain and Europe favor smaller investments in 
Kenya compared to the rest of the investing world. Thus, maybe a relation 
exists between size of investment and local participation. Table III shows 
that there does a^ fc^ seem to be a relation between size and overall local 
equity contribution, but there certainly seems to be some relation between 
size and public versus private partners. Perhaps public partners are even 
necessary to get foreign investors to .join especially large ventures. 
Table III. Local equity investment and size of investment 
Size Class (£) 
Number cf' 
Investments 
Local equity shares 
Overall (f) I ^ ^ v ^ M ^ ) '' \> Public(%) 
— 100,000 52 i_ 20.6 " 16.6 4*0 
100r0GV 
5Q0..QpQ 21 
. 
... . 2.3.6 . . 
1 
15.3 
- u <-
I — 8*2 
500',001-
1,000,000 3 2.0 - 2.0 
^1,006,006 5 J 25.0 2.1 22.9 
Another interesting feature of foreign investment is the use by 
foreign firms of local savings in the form of debt. Table IV shows these 
results. The "use" measure is an ad hoc ratio of local borrowings (public 
and private) to private foreign equity. It attempts to indicate the relative 
extent to which foreign investors use local debt."^ 
13) There were two cases of significant expansions in this study in which 
the only external finance was debt. These cases were excluded in 
calculating the "use" ratios since they would make the average use 
ratio infinitely large (these cases are indicated by "na^" in table IV. 
Table I?. Use of local debt "by investing country 
Country 
average degree 
of "use" (%)* 
average prix^ ate 
debt (£) 
average public 
debt (£) 
U.K. 442.8 41.172 46,651 
Aga Khan 166.9+cO^/ 18,257 8,333 
Japan 162.1 49.477 19,719 
India 151.2 98.763 567,286 
Continental 
Europe 129.0+ coi^/ 23,154 24,333 
U.S.A. 128.0 183,163 12,500 
Hong fCong 109.6 
Australia 108.8 5.586 _ 
Rhodesia 10.0 10 -
* Degree of "use" = (private + public local debt) ~ private foreign 
equity. 
The first result that stands out is the overwhelmingly greater 
use of local debt by British dominated firms, almost equally split between 
private and public (public debt being mainly from DFCK and ICDC). The 
British dominated firms borrow more than four times what they and their 
foreign partners put in on the average while for all the rest no more than 
67 percent more local debt is incurred than.foreign capital brought in. 
Actually, as will be recalled from table II, British investments are on the 
average only 17.6 percent locally controlled compared to much greater 
percents for firms from other areas. This implies the overall debt to 
equity ratio of British investments is itself much greater thai| for foreign 
investments from anywhere else. 
j 
The only possible statistical explanation that occurs to me is 
that Kenya banks and public financial institutions require debentures and 
mortgage instruments from 3ritish investors to a much greater eitent than 
from foreign investors from anywhere else. This would mean my data search 
picked up a greater percent of British borrowing than of other foreign investor i 
borrowings in Kenya which would show results such as in.table IV. How, 
although everyone knows the British.Empire has crumbled, I do )iot imagine it 
gets expressed in this way. Rather, it seems the British are indeed borrowing 
a relatively great amount of local savings. 
It might be further pointed out that the smallest amount of local 
debt TJSO was by a Rhodesian neon sign manufacturing firm (since merged into 
a bigger Kenya outfit) who borrowed 4fc.206/83 from Barclays D.C.O. in I962. 
Perhaps anticipating U.D.I., Barclays had a debenture on this debt. 
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But why do the British "borrow so much "both relative to their own 
capital contribution and relative to everyone else? In table I we saw that 
British.investments tend to be relatively smaller compared to other investors. 
However, the difference between British size preference and the size 
preference of Continental Europe and the Aga Khan are not nearly so great.as 
is the difference in their preferences for local debt. More to the point, 
one might see that size may not be the causative factor by considering table 
V. 
Table V. Use of local debt by size of firm 
Size class (£) 
"use" 
measure ($>) * 
average private 
debt (S.) 
average public 
debt (£.) 
~ 100.00 3 1 1 . 5 + o o ^ / 8,143 3.345 
100,001^ 
5co:obo 1 7 5 . 2 + ^ 0 ^ 85.899 19.095 
500,001-
1.000.000 313.3 331.231 33,333 
^ 1.000,000 442.702 751.014 
* See table IV. 
Here, except for one size class, the use of debt is remarkably even across 
size classes. It is also larger than one might expect from table IV, 
However, it should be remembered the British themselves account for 34 ®f 
the 81 investments in the study which could raise the average use measure 
by size.class to,the observed l e v e l s . O n e point that does appear from 
table V, however, supports a result from table III. That is, for very big 
projects finance from public sources becomes more prevalent, and perhaps 
even necessary, 
i 
Another potential explanation of British propensity to have 
Kenya savings pay for more of their investments than other foreign investors 
do might have to do with greater fear of devaluation by Englishmen than by 
other investors. That is, if the Kenya Pound is devalued, the foreign 
exchange value of one*s Kenya assets and liabilities declines and hence 
incurring debt is a hedge against devaluation losses: if: one's assets 
decline in value, so too, at least, does one's local debt. However, 
compared to the British Pound, the Kenya Pound is the Rock of Gibralter, 
and one would think Englishmen would in fact rather hold assets in Kenya 
as a hedge against British devaluation, 
14) At this point I cannot explain the approximately 85'percentage point 
difference between investments in the £100,001-£500,000 range and the 
rest. 
\ \ 
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By this point I am sure &t least every American-trained economist 
15) 
will he thinking, "what about Modigliani-Miller?" The M & M theory, J' in 
fact would suggest that either the British are idiosyncratic as there is no 
good economic reason for their preferring all that debt, or there are strong 
British taxation advantages to heavy debt finance for British.firms which 
§re not paralleled by taxation policies in Continental Europe, the U.S.A, 
Japan or India0 
However, a Tanzanian friend has suggested a reason which is so 
obvious it is probably true. In economists1 jargon, the .solution may lie 
on the supply side, not the demand side. More pointedly, Kenya's savings 
are mobilized primarily by British banks in Kenya who may just favor British 
companies in their lending p^ltlicies.. After all, are not these British 
Companies best known to British banks, and therefore, for "sound business 
reasons" woulH not the credit of British investors be especially good on the 
average? Could it not be that due to the "cost.of information", Britain 
still maintains an imperial preference in Kenya, at least as far as 
investment finance goes? Would this argument also apply to the public 
financial institutions of Kenya? 
The final data summary table to be shown presents annual 
statistics. All the oayeats mentioned in part II of this paper o$ the 
problems of data collection and classification should be recalled, especially 
with respect to the last two years' observations., This is all the more so 
since there is such a dramatic switch in 1969 from private local equity and 
debt to public local equity and debt. 
However, it does seem one can see things in table VI. For one, 
there is the effect of the adverse "investment climate" as Independence 
approached and the subsequent rush of investments when it- became clear that 
it was safe to invest in Kenyac In fact, one study of the investment climate 16) in Kenya in 1964 quoted one businessman as saying: 
"Now that a better indication of the political condition 
in Kenya is known, our project has been revised and may 
be consummated"o 
The study does ilotk concern over Kenya's future after Mzee dies, but approv-
ingly notes his "curbing Communist influence." It also favorably notes the 
15) Mertcn Miller and Franco Modigliani, "Dividend Policyr Growth and the 
Valuation of Shares", Journal of Business, U U J j (October, I96I, 4E1~33_$ 
"Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the Electric Utility 
Industry, .1954-57j" American Economic Review (ASS)j LVI,'No.3» (June, 
1966), 333-91; France Modigliani and Morton.Miller, "The Cost of Capital-
Corporation Finance and the 'Theory of Investment," AER9 XLVIII, No.3 
(June, 1958)»'261-97?——i—"Corporals Income -Taxes and the Cost of Capital: 
A Correction", AER, LIII, No.33 (June, 1963), 433-43. 
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Foreign Investment Protection Act of 1964 and. Sessional. Paper No ,10 on 
African Socialism for eliminating uncertainty on Kenya's view towards 
foreign investors. 
One other point suggested by the data of table 71 is that there 
seems no relation between investments in Kenya and the operation or lack 
of operation of the East African Common Market. Note especially the years 
of a dormant common market, 1964-7* 
On.the other hand, if my data is fairly cpmplete, there seems to 
be a decrease in activity to a lower level from 1967j but a drop especially 
in 1969* Further, I know of two substantial textile investments which were 
discussed in 1969? which never came off, probably because there was 
already excess capacity in textiles, as for example KiSumu Cotton Mills 
complained in some of their less than impressive Annual Reports, They also 
complained about the effect of the East African transfer taxes. Similarly 
City Brewery claimed in its 1969 Annual Report that it was forced to give 
up all its' own brewing business in 1969 because of difficulties in 
Tanzania and in February 1970 City Brewery, in fact, became a holding 
17) company having sold its brewing business to East African Breweries Ltd, ' 
However, a further explanation to a decrease in investment 
activity in the late 1960's observed in table VIlis suggested by another 
18") 
report on the investment climate in Kenya, this time for 1968. The 
report cites a "European /business/ association" who note 
"In future, foreign investors cannot to the same extent cpunt 
on the partnership of experienced and businessminded Asians, 
as has so far been the ease.. Considering the lack of 
entrepreneur-minded Africans, this new situation has a negative 
. effect on the investment climate". 
However, a response from a Kenya "Government spokesman" was also included -J " -J-i 
in the study: "Foreign investors should be in a better position in the future 
-re.. -/-- ' • 1 • . -• -.'-.e future 
by having Kenyans as partners in business, because the latter haye a sense 
of belonging to Kenya and hence constitute some form of security, the 
tendency of which is to reduce risk. An entrepreneurial class is rapidly 
16) National Industrial Conference Board (NICE), Obsta-pl&s and Incentives 
to Private Ppae&gn Investment, I962-I964, Studies in Business Policy 
No.115, (New York: NICB, 1965), p.92. 
17) From Annual Reports of City Breweries Ltd., and East African.Breweries Ltd. 
18) NICB,' Obstacles and. Incentives to Private Foreign Investment, 1967—1968. 
Vol.I, Obstacles, (New York: NICB. 1969)." P.85« 
emerging in Kenya and what would appear as a gap caused by emigration 
of the Asian "business community will not take long to bridge". 
Now again, if the data in table VI are reasonably complete, it took 
one year and the replacement was not African entreprenurs but public 
African organizations. In fact, in 1968 of the nine recorded.foreign 
investments, five had local equity participation and of those, four 
involved Kenya Asians. I have no record of any Asian participation in 
new foreign investments in 1969 or 1970. In both years the major local 
equity participants are ICDC and DFCK with the East African Development 
Bank joining in 1970®, ... . - "q^edc thai; 
oen»5s ^ yov-JlQ -©cnciBtoei c.- kfzi^zz. 


- 19 -
FOREIGN DEBT DOMESTIC DEW Debt 
"Use" 
measure* (%) 
Average 
private 
(i) 
TP £ 
U—' a. 
Average 
public 
Pu
bl
ic
 
(%)
 Average 
private 
(£) 
. Average 
public 
(£) 
... Average 
' private. 
(£) 
Average 
public 
U) 
542 0.4 mm 23333 
250 8.0 earn mm 10.341 Omm 35.1 
9750 . 15.0 mm a- *m 5 a» 5.0 
18060 38.9 ... • t 
5700 19.2 1125 3.8 6.875 «a> 22.649 7025 154.9 
4149 .14.0 8692 4,4 44.615 46.680 6923 78-6 
6906 25.3 44666 JUL. 192.617 SB. 71.365 100728 689.2+c^^ 
_ 8891 23.1 9,602 9.7 10.714 „ 95.325 11375 187.1 
8486 19.7 ML. 2.222 ... 182.793 j 13.888 705.4 
«•» 25000 12.5 58.919 50.000 2,25.6 
526 0.8 mL. 26.625 8,7^0 285.518 
*See table IV. 
Table VI. Time Series. 
